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This paper analyzes the problem of optimal taxation of top labor incomes. We develop a model where
top incomes respond to marginal tax rates through three channels: (1) the standard supply-side channel
through reduced economic activity, (2) the tax avoidance channel, (3) the compensation bargaining
channel through efforts in influencing own pay setting. We derive the optimal top tax rate formula
as a function of the three elasticities corresponding to those three channels of responses. The  first
elasticity (supply side) is the sole real factor limiting optimal top tax rates. The optimal tax system
should be designed to minimize the second elasticity (avoidance) through tax enforcement and tax
neutrality across income forms, in which case the second elasticity becomes irrelevant. The optimal
top tax rate increases with the third elasticity (bargaining) as bargaining efforts are zero-sum in aggregate.
We then analyze top income and top tax rate data in 18 OECD countries. There is a strong correlation
between cuts in top tax rates and increases in top 1% income shares since 1975, implyingthat the overall
elasticity is large. But top income share increases have not translated into higher economic growth,
consistent with the zero-sum bargaining model. This suggests that the first elasticity is modest in size
and that the overall effect comes mostly from the third elasticity. Consequently, socially optimal top
tax rates might possibly be much higher than what is commonly assumed.
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The share of total pre-tax income accruing to upper income groups has increased sharply in
the United States. The top percentile income share has more than doubled from less than
10% in the 1970s to over 20% in recent years (Piketty and Saez, 2003). This trend toward
income concentration has taken place in a number of other countries, especially English speaking
countries, but is much more modest in continental Europe or Japan (Atkinson, Piketty, Saez,
2011 and Alvaredo et al. 2011). At the same time, top tax rates on upper income earners have
declined signicantly in many OECD countries, again particularly in English speaking countries.
For example, the US top marginal federal individual tax rate stood at an astonishingly high
91% in the 1950s-1960s but is only 35% today (see Figure 1).
While there have been many discussions both in the academic literature and the public
debate about the causes of the surge in top incomes, there is not a fully compelling explanation.
Most explanations can be classied into market driven changes vs. institution driven changes.
The market driven stories posit that technological progress has been skilled-biased and has
favored top earners relative to average earners (e.g., Gabaix and Landier (2008) for CEOs as
well as Winner-Take-All theories for superstars, following Rosen (1981)). The key problem
with those pure market explanations is that they cannot account for the fact that top income
shares have only increased modestly in advanced countries such as Japan or Germany or France
which are also subject to the same technological forces. The institution driven stories posit
that changes in institutions, dened to include labor and nancial market regulations, Union
policies, tax policy, and also more broadly social norms regarding pay disparity and in particular
tolerance for executive pay, have played a key role in the evolution of inequality. Simply put,
under that view, the Reagan and Thatcher revolutions ushered new eras in the United States
and United Kingdom that favored the rich and signicantly increased their bargaining power
while other countries were less aected (see Bartels 2008 and Hacker and Pierson 2010 for US
analyzes along those lines). The main diculty is that \institutions" are multi-dimensional and
it is dicult to estimate compellingly the contribution of each specic factor.
Related to this issue, there is also a wide empirical literature in public economics analyzing
the eects of tax rates on pre-tax incomes (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2011 for a recent
survey) that reaches two broad conclusions. First, there is compelling evidence that upper
incomes respond to tax rates whenever the tax code oers opportunities for tax avoidance.
1Such responses can sometime be quite large, especially in the short-run.1 Second and related,
when the tax base is broad and does not oer avoidance opportunities, the estimated elasticities
are never large at least in the short or medium-run. In other words, all the compellingly large
elasticity estimates obtained in the literature are always due to tax avoidance or short-run re-
timing. Hence, no study to date has been able to show convincing evidence in the short or
medium-run of large actual economic real economic activity responses of upper earners to tax
rates. However, it is dicult to provide compelling estimates of long-run elasticities. As we shall
see, international evidence shows a strong correlation between top tax rate cuts and increases
in top income shares in OECD countries since 1975. Interestingly, the link between top rate
cuts and top income share increases is strong in English speaking countries but much smaller
in other countries such as Japan or Sweden which also experienced large top tax rate cuts.
There are three narratives of the link between top tax rates and upper incomes. First,
after noting that top US incomes surged following the large top marginal tax rate cuts of
the 1980s, Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) proposed a standard supply-side story whereby
lower tax rates stimulates economic activity among top income earners (work, entrepreneurship,
savings, etc.). Second, it has been pointed out{originally by Slemrod, 1996{that many of those
dramatic responses were actually primarily due to tax avoidance rather than real economic
behavior. Although this argument started as a left-wing critique of the supply-side success
story, it has more recently been used as a right-wing argument to deny that any real increase
in income concentration actually took place (Reynolds, 2007). Under this scenario, the real US
top income shares were as high in the 1970s as they are today but a smaller fraction of top
incomes was reported on tax returns in the 1970s than today. A third narrative contends that
high top tax rates were part of the institutional set-up putting a brake on top compensation
through bargaining or rent extraction eects. When top marginal tax rates are very high, the
net reward to a highly paid executive for bargaining for more compensation is modest. Under
this scenario, some countries such as Japan still have societal or institutional brakes on large top
compensation in spite of relatively low top tax rates. In contrast, in countries such as the United
1For example, in the United States, realized capital gains surged in 1986 in anticipation of the increase in the
capital gains tax rate after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Auerbach, 1988). Similarly, exercises of stock options
surged in 1992 before the 1993 top rate increase took place (Goolsbee, 2000). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also
led to a shift from corporate to individual income as it became more advantageous to be organized as a business
taxed solely at the individual level rather than as a corporation taxed rst at the corporate level (Slemrod, 1996;
Gordon and Slemrod, 2000).
2States or the United Kingdom, such (non-tax) brakes are not present{and possibly disappeared
at the same time as the high top tax rates during the Reagan or Thatcher revolutions.
The rst goal of this paper is to present a very simple model of optimal top labor income
taxation that can capture all three avenues of response, the standard supply side response, the
tax avoidance response, and the compensation bargaining response to assess how each narrative
translates into tax policy implications.2 We therefore derive the optimal top tax rate formula
as a function of the three elasticities corresponding to those three channels of responses. The
rst elasticity (supply side) is the sole real factor limiting optimal top tax rates. A large tax
avoidance elasticity is a symptom of a poorly design tax system. A very high top tax rate
within such a system oering many tax avoidance opportunities is counter-productive. Hence,
the optimal tax system should be designed to minimize tax avoidance opportunities through
a combination of tax enforcement, base broadening, and tax neutrality across income forms.
In that case, the second elasticity (avoidance) becomes irrelevant. The optimal top tax rate
increases with the third elasticity (bargaining) as bargaining eorts are wasteful and zero-sum
in aggregate. If a substantial fraction of the behavioral response of top earners comes from
bargaining eects and top earners are not paid less than their economic product, then the
optimal top tax rate is much higher than the conventional formula and actually goes to 100%
if the real supply-side elasticity is very small.3
In our view, this is the right model to account for the very high, quasi-conscatory top
marginal rates{80%-90% or more{applied in the United States and the United Kingdom between
the 1940s and the 1970s (see Figure 1). That is, policy makers and public opinions at that time
probably considered{rightly or wrongly{that at the very top of the income ladder, pay increases
reect mostly greed and socially wasteful activities rather than productive work eort. Whether
they were right or wrong is certainly a complicated empirical issue. But in order to address
this issue in a meaningful way, we rst need a proper conceptual framework within which the
various conicting claims can be rationalized. To our knowledge this is the rst paper oering
2This paper focuses on the optimal taxation of top labor incomes. The optimal taxation of top capital incomes
and top wealth holdings (via one-o inheritance taxes or annual property and wealth taxes) raises other issues,
which we address in Piketty and Saez (2011). Importantly, if there is a fuzzy frontier between dierent kinds of
ow incomes then it is inecient to have very dierent tax rates on labor vs. capital income, a point we will
later address in this paper.
3The optimal top tax rate is moderate if the supply elasticity is fairly large and top earners are underpaid
relative to their product, a situation that is theoretically possible in our model and might exist in countries with
very low income concentration.
3such a framework.
Needless to say, we would also very much like to be able to provide convincing empirical
estimates of the three elasticities e1, e2 and e3. So the second goal of the paper is to use inter-
national time series evidence on the evolution of top marginal tax rates, top income shares, and
economic growth among about 18 OECD countries since the 1970s to examine broad correlations
and determine which scenarios t best with the data. We deliberately use a macro-approach be-
cause the micro-approach (reviewed extensively in Saez, Slemrod, Giertz, 2011) cannot measure
compellingly long-term eects that are needed to assess scenarios and draw policy conclusions.
We are well aware that the macro-approach requires unduly strong identication assumptions
and hence should be seen as an illustrative rst step rather than a denitive proof.
We obtain three main results. First, we nd a very clear correlation between the drop in
top marginal tax rates and the surge in top income shares since 1975. This suggests that the
long-run total elasticity of top incomes with respect to the net-of-tax rate is large. That is,
e = e1 +e2 +e3 appears to be large, around 0.5. Interestingly, there is signicant heterogeneity
across countries suggesting that the total elasticity varies signicantly across countries.
Second, examination of the US case suggests that the tax avoidance response cannot account
for a signicant fraction of the long-run surge in top incomes because top income shares based
on a broad denition of income (that includes realized capital gains and hence a signicant part
of avoidance channels) has increased virtually as much as top income shares based on a narrower
denition of income subject to the progressive tax schedule.4 That is, the elasticity e2 appears
to be small (say, e2 < 0:1).
Third, we nd no evidence of a correlation between growth in real GDP per capita and the
drop in the top marginal tax rate in the period 1975 to the present. This evidence, admittedly
only suggestive, is consistent with the bargaining model whereby gains at the top come at the
expense of lower income earners. This suggests that the rst elasticity is modest in size and
that the overall eect comes mostly from the third elasticity. Consequently, socially optimal
top tax rates might possibly be much higher than what is commonly assumed.
In our preferred estimates, we nd an overall elasticity e = 0:5, which can be decomposed
into e1 = 0:2 (at most), e2 = 0 and e3 = 0:3 (at least). This corresponds to a socially optimal
4The avoidance scenario cannot explain well either why top income shares have remained relatively low in
countries such as Japan where top tax rates have also decreased dramatically and where incentives for tax
avoidance are not higher than in the United States.
4top tax rate  = 83% - as compared to  = 57% in the standard supply-side case with
e = e1 = 0:5 and e2 = e3 = 0. This illustrates the critical importance of this decomposition
into three elasticities. We hope this will contribute to stimulating further research on obtaining
better empirical estimates of e1, e2 and e3 in the future.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents briey the standard
model with real supply-side economic responses. Section 3 introduces tax avoidance and income
shifting responses. Section 4 introduces compensation bargaining responses. Section 5 presents
an empirical application using international evidence since the 1970s. Section 6 briey concludes.
2 Standard Model: Real Economic Responses
In the paper, we denote by z taxable earnings and by T(z) the nonlinear tax schedule. We
assume a constant marginal tax rate  in the top bracket above a given income threshold  z.5
We assume without loss of generality that the number of taxpayers in the top bracket has
measure one at the optimum.6 We refer to this group as top bracket taxpayers. We focus on
the determination of the optimal top tax rate , taking  z as given.
We start with the standard Mirrlees (1971) model. We will always assume away income
eects for simplicity and tractability, and consider utility functions of the form:
ui(c;z) = c   hi(z);
where z is pre-tax earnings, c = z   T(z) is disposable income, and hi(z) denotes the labor
supply cost of earning z which is increasing and convex in z.7 Optimal eort choice is given
by the rst order condition h0
i(z) = 1    where  is the marginal tax rate so that individual
earnings zi(1   ) are solely a function of the net-of-tax rate 1   . Aggregating over all top
bracket taxpayers, we denote by z(1 ) the average income reported by top bracket taxpayers,
as a function of the net-of-tax rate. The aggregate elasticity of income in the top bracket with
5For example, in the case of the Federal US individual income tax for year 2011, ordinary taxable income
above  z = $379;150 is taxed at the top marginal tax rate of  = 0:35. When combining all taxes including state
taxes, the total US marginal tax rate is 42.5% in 2011 (see Diamond and Saez, 2011).
6Naturally, because of behavioral responses, the number of taxpayers in the top bracket will dier from one
when the tax rate changes.
7In the standard formulation where individuals dier only through their wage rate wi and z = wil with l
labor supply, cost of eort takes the form hi(z) = h(z=wi) = h(l). Our formulation nests this standard case and
is useful for subsequent extensions.







This is the standard rst elasticity that reects real economic responses to the net-of-tax rate,
which can be labeled as labor supply eects, broadly dened (more hours of work, more intense
eort per hour worked, occupational choices, etc.)




subject to an aggregate budget constraint:
Z
T(zi)d(i)  T0
where G(:) is an increasing and concave function, and d(i) is the density mass of people of
individuals of type i, and T0  0 is an exogenous tax revenue requirement. Denoting by p the
multiplier of the government budget constraint, we dene the social marginal welfare weight on
individual i as gi = G0(ui)=p. Because there are no income eects, the average of the social
welfare weights, gi in the population, denoted E (g) is equal to one.8
In this paper, we always assume that the average social marginal welfare weight among
top bracket income earners is zero. If the social welfare function G(:) has curvature so that
G0(u) ! 0 when u ! 1, this will be the case when  z ! 1 and will hence approximately
be true for large  z. Considering a zero marginal welfare weight allows us to obtain an upper
bound on the optimal top tax rate. We mention briey how formulas ought to be modied if
we instead put a positive social welfare weight g on the marginal consumption of top bracket
earners (relative to average).




1 + a  e1
; (2)
where a = z=(z    z) = (z= z)=(z= z   1) > 1 is the Pareto parameter of the top tail of the
8This can be seen as follows. If the government increases taxes by $1 on everybody, the impact on social
welfare (measured in units of public funds) is by denition equal to
R
gid(i). Such a tax change creates no
behavioral responses (as we rule out income eects) and hence the net scal gain for the government is
R
d(i).
At an optimal tax schedule, the benets of such a reform would just equal its cost, so that E (g) = 1.
6distribution. As the social marginal welfare weight on top bracket income earners is zero,  is
also the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue collected from the top bracket.9
Proof: The proof of formula (2) is simple. It is useful to present it as derivations in Sections
3 and 4 build upon the derivation in this simple case. The government chooses  to maximize
tax revenue T from the top bracket (as the government puts no marginal social welfare weight
on top bracket earners):
T = [z(1   )    z]:
The rst order condition is




The rst term in square brackets represents the mechanical tax gain of increasing  while the
second term represents the tax revenue loss due to behavioral responses to the tax increase.










which can be rearranged into formula (2). QED.
Formula (2) shows that the optimal tax rate can be expressed in terms of two empirically
estimable statistics: the Pareto parameter a of the top tail of the income distribution and the
elasticity e1 of income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Empirically, it is straightforward to estimate a as z=(z    z) using income distribution data.
In a given year and country, a is extremely stable with  z (see e.g., Diamond and Saez, 2011 for
an analysis using recent US data). In recent years, a ' 1:5 in the United States. Countries with
less income concentration than the United States such as continental Europe or Japan have
a ' 2 (see Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011).10
It is much more dicult to obtain a compelling empirical estimate of the elasticity e1. Saez,
Slemrod, and Giertz (2011) provide a recent survey of the literature to which we will come back
later on in detail in Section 5. Formula (2) shows that the supply side elasticity e1 is the key
factor limiting how high the top tax rate can be. For example, with a = 1:5, e1 = :25 yields a
revenue maximizing tax rate  of 73%, e1 = :5, yields  = 57%, and e1 = 1 yields  = 40%.
9If a positive social weight g > 0 is set on top earners marginal consumption, then the optimal top tax rate
is  = (1   g)=(1   g + ae).
10Note that a is endogenous to  only if the elasticity is not constant within the top bracket. But formula (2)
continues to apply even when a is endogenous, although it then becomes an implicit formula.
7As mentioned above, the top income tax rate on earnings in the United States today is around
 = 42:5% when taking into account all taxes (see Diamond and Saez, 2011). As we shall see,
countries in continental Europe tend to have signicantly higher top marginal tax rates on labor
income, sometimes close to or above 60%.
In the remaining of the paper, we want to extend this tax model to account for other
behavioral responses, namely tax avoidance (Section 3) and bargaining for pay (Section 4), and
analyze how those additional elements alter the basic formula (2).
3 Tax Avoidance Responses
As shown by many empirical studies (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2011 for a recent survey),
responses to tax rates can also take the form of tax avoidance. We can dene tax avoidance
as changes in reported income due to changes in the form of compensation but not in the
total level of compensation, and while keeping economic output constant. Examples of such
avoidance/evasion are (a) reductions in current cash compensation for increased fringe benets
or deferred compensation such as stock-options or future pensions, (b) increased consumption
within the rm such as better oces, vacation disguised as business travel, private use of
corporate jets, etc. (c) changes in the form of business organization such as shifting prots from
the individual income tax base to the corporate tax base, (d) re-characterization of ordinary
income into tax favored capital gains, (e) outright tax evasion such as using o-shore accounts.
In all those cases, tax avoidance opportunities arise because taxpayers can shift part of their
taxable income into another form or another time period that is treated more favorably from a
tax perspective.
The key distinction between real and tax avoidance responses is that real responses reect
underlying, deep individual preferences for work and consumption while tax avoidance responses
depend critically on the design of the tax system and the avoidance opportunities it oers. While
the government cannot change underlying deep individual preferences and hence the size of the
real elasticity, it can change the tax system to reduce avoidance opportunities. For example,
increased tax enforcement{perhaps through international cooperation{can reduce the use of
o-shore accounts for tax evasion. Private consumption within the rm is also conceptually
taxable and can be curtailed through tax enforcement eorts. Neutrality in the eective tax
rates across organizational forms could also eliminate income shifting. Making fringe benets
8fully taxable instead of tax exempt would eliminate this tax avoidance opportunity as well.
Similarly, aligning the tax rates on realized capital gains with those on ordinary income would
eliminate the benets of converting ordinary income into capital gains.
A number of papers have tried and capture avoidance eects for optimal tax design. Saez
(2004) and Saez, Giertz, and Slemrod (2011) propose related analyzes but taking avoidance
opportunities as given. Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) endogenize avoidance opportunities in a
multi-good model where the government selects the tax base. Finally, a large literature (surveyed
in Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002)) analyzes optimal policy design in the presence of tax evasion.
Our model is more basic and tries to capture the key-tradeos as simply and transparently as
possible.
3.1 Pure Tax Avoidance
We can extend the original model as follows to incorporate tax avoidance. Let us denote by y
real income is y and by x sheltered income so that ordinary taxable income is z = y   x. The
latter is taxed at marginal tax rate  in the top bracket, while sheltered income x is taxed at a
constant and uniform marginal tax rate t lower than . For example, in the case of untaxable
fringe benets, t = 0. In the case of capital gains conversion, t > 0 but is signicantly less than
. The utility function of individual i takes the form:
ui(c;y;x) = c   hi(y)   di(x);
where c = y   z   tx + R = (1   )y + (   t)x + R is disposable after tax income and
R =  z T( z) denotes the virtual income coming out of the nonlinear tax schedule. hi(y) is the
utility cost of earning real income y, and di(x) is the cost of sheltering an amount of income x.
There is a cost to sheltering, since sheltered income such as fringe benets or deferred earnings
are less valuable than cash income. We assume that both hi(:) and di(:) are increasing and
convex, and normalized so that h0
i(0) = d0
i(0) = 0. This model naturally nests the standard
model when the sheltering cost di(x) is innitely large for any x > 0.
Individual utility maximization implies that
h
0
i(y) = 1    and d
0
i(x) =    t;
so that yi is an increasing function of 1  and xi is an increasing function of the tax dierential
   t. Aggregating over all top bracket taxpayers, we have y = y(1   ) with real elasticity
9e1 = [(1   )=y]dy=d(1   ) > 0 and x = x(   t) increasing in    t. Note that x(0) = 0 as
there is sheltering only when  > t.
Hence z = z(1   ;t) = y(1   )   x(   t) is increasing in 1    and t. We denote by
e = [(1   )=z]@z=@(1   ) > 0 the total elasticity of taxable income z with respect to 1   
when keeping t constant. We denote by s the fraction of the behavioral response of z to d due
to tax avoidance, and by e2 = s  e the tax avoidance elasticity component:
s =
dx=d(   t)










By construction, we have (1 s)e = (y=z)e1, or equivalently e = (y=z)e1+e2. If we start from a
situation with no tax avoidance (y = z), then we simply have e = e1+e2 , i.e. the total elasticity
is the sum of the standard labor supply elasticity and the tax avoidance elasticity component.




1 + t  a  e2
1 + a  e
; (3)
where e = (y=z)e1 + e2. is the total elasticity of taxable income (keeping t constant), e1 =
[(1   )=y]dy=d(1   ) is the real labor supply elasticity, and e2 = [(1   )=z]dx=d(   t) is the
tax avoidance elasticity component.
General optimum: If sheltering occurs only within top bracket earners, the optimal global





1 + a  e1
; (4)
Hence, sheltering becomes irrelevant in the full optimum.
Proof: As top bracket earners are of measure 1, the government chooses  to maximize:
T = [z(1   ;t)    z] + tx(   t)
The rst order condition for  is







Introducing s, we can rewrite the rst order condition as







10The rst two terms are the same as in the standard model. The third term captures the \scal
externality" as a fraction s of the behavioral response translates into sheltered income taxed at










which can be rearranged into formula (3) using the fact that e2 = se.
The second part of the proof can be obtained by taking the rst order condition with respect
to t and recalling that z(1   ;t) = y(1   )   x(   t),




Here we have used the assumption stated in the proposition that sheltering happens only within
top bracket taxpayers so that a change in t has no eect on individuals below the top bracket.
As x  0 and   t and dx=d(   t)  0, this rst order condition can only hold for t =  and
x(   t = 0) = 0. Setting t =  in equation (3), and noting that x = 0 implies that z = y and
hence (1   s)  e = e1, we immediately obtain (4). Intuitively, as x is completely wasteful, it is
optimal to deter x entirely by setting t = . QED.
Four comments are worth noting about Proposition 1. First, if t = 0 then  = 1=(1 + a  e)
as in the standard model. In the narrow framework where the tax system is taken as given (i.e.
there is nothing we can do about tax evasion and income shifting), and where sheltered income
is totally untaxed, then whether e is due to real responses vs. avoidance responses is irrelevant,
a point made by Feldstein (1999).
Second however, if t > 0, then sheltering creates a \scal externality," as the shifted income is
taxed at rate t and  > 1=(1+ae). As discussed earlier and as shown in the empirical literature
(Saez, Slemrod, Giertz 2011), it is almost always the case that large short-term behavioral
responses generated by tax changes are due to some form of income shifting or income re-timing
that generates scal externalities.
Third and most important, the government can improve eciency and its ability to tax
upper incomes by closing tax avoidance opportunities (setting t =  in our model), in which
case the real elasticity e1 is the only factor limiting taxes on upper incomes.11
11Kopczuk (2005) shows that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States, which broadened the tax base
and closed loopholes did reduce the elasticity of reported income with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
11Fourth, note that actual tax avoidance opportunities come in two varieties. Some are pure
creations of the tax system, such as exemption of fringe benets or tax exempt local government
bonds and hence could be entirely eliminated by reforming the tax system. In that case, t is a free
parameter that the government can change at no cost as in our model. Yet other tax avoidance
opportunities reect real enforcement constraints that are costly{sometimes even impossible{
for the government to eliminate. For example, it is very dicult for the government to tax
prots from informal cash businesses, consumption inside informal businesses, or o-shore tax
evasion. Our simple model also ignores that there might be political hurdles to setting t = ,
for example if some types of tax sheltering are ercely defended by special interests or lobbying
groups (Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002 present a model with costs of enforcement). The important
policy question is then what fraction of the tax avoidance elasticity can be eliminated by tax
redesign and tax enforcement. In a developing country with most economic activity taking
place in small informal businesses, the tax avoidance elasticity cannot be reduced to zero. But
in a modern economy and with international cooperation, the tax avoidance elasticity could be
made minimal especially at the top of the distribution where virtually all economic transactions
are recorded and hence veriable (Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez, 2009).
3.2 Income Shifting
The previous avoidance model assumed that shifting was entirely wasteful so that there was no
reason to want to set t lower than  to start with. In reality, there are sometimes legitimate
eciency or distributional reasons why a government would want to tax dierent forms of
income dierently. On eciency grounds, the classic Ramsey theory of optimal taxation indeed
recommends taxing less the most elastic goods or factors.
Let us therefore extend our previous model by considering that there are two sources of
income that we will call labor income and capital income for simplicity.12 Labor income and
capital income may respond to taxes dierently and individuals can at some cost shift income
from one form to the other. For example, in the case of labor vs. capital income in a dual tax
system, small business owners can choose whether to get labor income as self-employed laborers
or whether to get dividends from the prots of a closely held business.
We assume that labor income zL is taxed nonlinearly with a top tax rate L above  z, while
12Other examples could be individual income vs. corporate income, or realized capital gains vs. ordinary
income, or self-employment earnings vs. employee earnings.
12capital income zK is taxed linearly at a constant and uniform tax rate K. We make the simpli-
fying assumption that all capital income is earned by individuals in the top labor income bracket
so that changing K has no impact on earners below the top bracket. Hence, all individuals who
can potentially shift labor income into capital income have yL   z. True labor (respectively,
capital) income is denoted by yL, (respectively, yK) while reported labor (respectively, capital)
income is zL = yL   x (respectively, zK = yK + x) where x represents the amount of income
shifting between the tax bases. Individual i has utility function:
ui(c;yL;yK;x) = c   hLi(yL)   hKi(yK)   di(x);
with
c = R + (1   L)zL + (1   K)zK = R + (1   L)yL + (1   K)yK + (L   K)x
where R = L z   T( z) is virtual income created by the nonlinear labor income tax, hLi(yL) is
the cost of producing labor income yL, hKi(yK) is the cost of producing capital income yK, and
di(x) is the cost of shifting income from the labor to the capital base. We assume that hLi,
hKi, and di are all convex. Note that di(x)  0 is dened for both positive and negative x. We
naturally assume that di(0) = 0 and d0
i(0) = 0 and that d0
i(x) ? 0 i x ? 0. This model nests
the pure tax avoidance model of Section 3.1 in the case where yK  0, i.e., there is no intrinsic
capital income. Individual utility maximization implies that
h
0
Li(yL) = 1   L; h
0
Ki(yK) = 1   K; and d
0
i(x) = L   K;
so that yLi is an increasing function of 1 L, yKi is an increasing function of 1 K, and xi is an
increasing function of the tax dierential L   K. Aggregating over all top bracket taxpayers,
we have yL = yL(1 L) with real elasticity eL > 0, yK = yK(1 K) with real elasticity eK > 0,
and x = x(L   K) increasing in  = L   K and x(0) = 0.
Whether the elasticity of labor income eL is larger or smaller than the elasticity of capital
income eK is very much an open issue. Of course a complete analysis of labor vs. capital taxation
should also take into account dynamic issues, which we do not consider here (by choice, we focus
upon the purely static, income shifting issue).13
13The taxation of capital raises two intrinsically dynamic issues: intergenerational transmission of capital
(this tends to push toward higher taxation of capital than labor, assuming meritocratic social preferences) and
intertemporal, within-a-lifetime allocation of consumption (this tends to push in the opposite direction). See
Piketty and Saez (2011).
13Note that zL = yL   x() is more responsive than yL to 1   L when keeping K constant
as zL responds along both the real margin and the avoidance margin. Similarly, zK is more
responsive to 1   K than yK. For example, if shifting has low cost, then x is very responsive
to . This implies that zL is very responsive to changes in L and zK is very responsive to K
even if the underlying real corresponding incomes yL and yK are fully inelastic.
Finally, we dene the Pareto parameter as aL = zL=(zL    z) for reported labor income and
a = (zK + zL)=(zK + zL    z) for total income.
Proposition 2 The optimal tax rates L and K maximizing tax revenue are such that:
No shifting Elasticity. If x  0 (no income shifting), then L = 1=(1 + aL  eL) and
K = 1=(1 + eK). We have: L > K i aL  eL < eK .
Innite shifting Elasticity. In the limit where x0 is very large and real responses have
nite elasticities eL and eK, then L = K = 1=(1 + a   e) with  e = (yLeL + yKeK)=(yL + yK) is
the average real elasticity (weighted by income).
General Case. In case aL  eL < eK , we have: 1=(1 + aL  eL)  L > K  1=(1 + eK).
In the opposite case, we have the reverse inequality: 1=(1 + aL  eL)  L < K  1=(1 + eK).
Proof: See appendix A. QED.
Three comments on Proposition 2 are worth making. First, absent any shifting elasticity,
there is no cross elasticity and we obtain the standard Ramsey inverse elasticity rule for each
income factor.14
Second, a shifting elasticity brings the optimal tax rates L and K closer together (relative
to the inverse elasticity rule). When the shifting elasticity is large, optimal tax rates L and
K should be close{even if the real elasticities eL and eK are quite dierent. Importantly,
the presence of shifting does not necessarily reduce the ability of the government to tax but
only alters the relative mix of tax rates. For example, in the case with innite shifting, the
optimum tax rates on labor and capital are equal and should be based on the average of the
real elasticities.
Third, in this simple model, deciding whether labor or capital income should be taxed more
requires comparing the intrinsic elasticities eL and eK. Empirically, this would require increasing
simultaneously both L and K to determine which factor responds most keeping the level of
income shifting x() constant.
14As we have no income eects, the elasticities are also compensated elasticities.
144 Compensation Bargaining Responses
Pay may not be equal marginal economic product for top income earners. In particular, execu-
tives can be overpaid if they are entrenched and can use their power to inuence compensation
committees. Indeed, a large literature in corporate nance has made those points (see for
instance Bebchuk and Fried (2004) for an overview).
In principle, executives could also be underpaid relative to their marginal product if there
is social outrage about high levels of compensation. In that case, a company might nd it more
protable to under-pay its executives than face the wrath of its other employees, customers, or
the public in general.15 To the extent that top income earners generally have more opportunities
to set their own pay than low and middle income earners, the rst case seems more likely. But
from a theoretical perspective both cases are interesting.
More generally, pay can dier from marginal product in any model in which compensation
is decided by on-the-job bargaining between an employer and an employee, as in the classic
search model of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. Pissarides (2000) for an exposition).
In that framework, there is a rent to be shared on the job because of frictions in the matching
process and inability to commit to a wage before the match has occurred. Indeed, in such
models, the wage rate is not pinned down and can actually be anywhere in a band bounded by
the outside options of the employer and the employee (Hall, 2005). Typically, the wage is then
determined by the relative bargaining powers of the employer and employee, as is the case with
Nash bargaining with exogenous weights. In general, the wage rate is not ecient, unless the
so-called Hosios condition is met.16 Given the substantial costs involved in replacing quits in
most modern work environments, especially at management levels where specic human capital
is important, it seems reasonable to think that there would be a band of possible compensation
levels. In such a context, bargaining eorts on the job can conceivably play a signicant role
in determining pay. Marginal tax rates aect the rewards to bargaining eort and hence can
possibly aect the level of such bargaining eorts.
Let us take an example which will be familiar to academic economists. In many University
departments, pay is determined by outside options taking the form of competitive oers from
15Recent examples of such outrage have arisen in the case of the 2008 and 2009 bailouts of nancial rms in
the United States{although the eects on executives compensation has remained unclear.
16Those standard search models stand in contrast to newer \directed search" models where the wage is
negotiated ex-ante in which case eciency is restored (see e.g., Moen, 1997).
15similarly or higher-ranked departments. Because moving costs are dicult to observe by the
upper administration of one's home University, a formal competitive oer letter is often sucient
to trigger a pay increase in one's current job. Obtaining an outside oer for the sole purposes
of getting a pay raise is costly and time consuming (both for the academic and to potential
recruiters). If the pay raise in the home institution does not translate into higher productivity,
then this is a pure compensation bargaining elasticity. Obviously, lower tax rates make the pay
raise more valuable.17
There is relatively little work in optimal taxation that uses models where pay diers from
marginal product. A few studies have analyzed optimal taxation in models with labor market
imperfections such as search models (see e.g., Boone and Bovenberg, 2002), union models (see
e.g., Fuest and Huber, 1997 and Aronsson and Sjogren, 2004), eciency wages models (see e.g.,
Koskela and Sch ob (2007)). Sorensen (1999) provides a simple overview of those models. The
main focus of those papers has been on eciency issues rather than redistribution issues, with
most of the focus on the employment vs. unemployment margin. Therefore, most of those
models do not incorporate heterogeneity among workers and hence cannot capture the issue
of redistribution between workers as we do here. Fewer papers have addressed redistributive
optimal tax policy in models with imperfect labor markets. Hungerbuhler et al. (2006) analyze
a search model with heterogeneous productivity, and Stantcheva (2011) considers contracting
models where rms cannot observe perfectly the productivity of their employees.
Most closely related to our paper, Rothschild and Scheuer (2011) consider a model with
rent-seeking and earnings heterogeneity. The key dierence between their core model and ours
is that they consider a two-sector model where crowdable rent-seeking activities are limited
to a single sector with no direct externalities to the other sector. As a result, in their core
model, it is optimal to limit entry in the crowdable rent-seeking activity. High top tax rates
discourage labor supply conditional on entry in the rent-seeking sector but may encourage entry
which is inecient. While this is a good model for a clearly segregated sector with a production
limit{such as a natural resource extraction sector, it does not capture the notion that the pay
of top earners can come at the expense of lower paid workers economy wide as in our model.
Importantly and consistent with our analysis, they also obtain higher optimal tax rates when
they allow externalities across sectors in an extension of their model. More broadly, their
17If the productivity of a given academic economist varies with department location and taxes reduce mobility,
then the location response to taxes is partly a supply side e1 elasticity.
16approach is theoretical and uses a complex multi-dimensional screening approach. Hence, they
are more interested in properties of the optimum, rather than developing simple tractable top
rate formulas expressed in terms of estimable elasticities as we do here. Thus, we view our two
contributions as complementary.
In this section, we consider the simplest model that can capture such bargaining compensa-
tion eects. Let us assume that individual i receives a fraction  of his/her actual product y.
Individual i can put productive eort into increasing y or bargaining eort into increasing .
Both types of eort are costly to the individual. Hence, individual i utility is given by
u
i(c;;y) = c   hi(y)   ki();
where c is disposable after-tax income, hi(y) is the cost of producing output y as in the standard
model, and ki() is the cost of bargaining to get a share  of the product. Both hi and ki are
increasing and convex.18 We again rule out income eects as this simplies substantially the
derivations. Note that this model nests the standard model in the case where there is no cost
to have  = 1 and innite cost to the individual to pushing  above 1.
Let b = (  1)y be bargained earnings dened as the gap between received earnings y and
actual product y. Note that the model allows both overpay (when  > 1 and hence b > 0)
and underpay (when  < 1 and hence b < 0). Let us denote by E (b) the average bargained
earnings in the economy. In the aggregate, it must be the case that aggregate product must
be equal to aggregate compensation. Hence, if E(b) > 0, average overpay E (b) must come at
the expense of somebody. Symmetrically, if E (b) < 0, average underpay  E (b) must benet
somebody. For simplicity, we assume that any gain made through bargaining comes at the
expense of everybody else in the economy uniformly. Hence, individual incomes are all reduced
by a uniform amount E (b) (or increased by a uniform amount -E(b) if E(b) < 0). A simple but
admittedly unrealistic scenario in which our uniformity assumption holds is a situation where
rms are owned equally in the population and bargaining pay comes at the expense of prots.
We describe such a simple model fully in Appendix B. In reality, bargaining pay likely comes at
the expense of other employees or shareholders in the same company. Some of the bargaining
overpay might also be partly passed on to prices of the goods produced.19
18We could consider a general non separable cost of eort function hi(y;) to allow for example for substitution
between productive vs. bargaining eort. The optimal tax formula would be identical but the comparative statics
would be less transparent and would require additional assumptions.
19We discuss below how relaxing our simplifying uniformity assumption would aect our results.
17Because the government uses a nonlinear income tax schedule, it can adjust the demogrant
intercept  T(0) to fully oset E (b). Eectively, the government can always tax (or subsidize)
E (b) at 100% before applying its nonlinear income tax. Hence, we can assume without loss
of generality that the government absorbs one-for-one any change in E(b). Therefore, we can
simply dene earnings as z = y = y +b and assume that those earnings are taxed nonlinearly.
This simplication is possible because of our key assumption that E (b) aects all individuals
uniformly.
Individual i chooses y and  to maximize:
u
i(c;;y) =   y   T(  y)   hi(y)   ki();
which leads to the rst order conditions
(1   ) = h
0
i(y) and (1   )y = k
0
i();
where  = T 0 is the marginal tax rate. This naturally denes yi, i as increasing functions of
the net-of-tax rate 1   . Hence zi = i  yi and bi = (1   i)  yi are also functions of 1   .
Let us consider as in the previous section the optimal top tax rate  above income level  z.
We assume again that there is a mass of measure one of top bracket taxpayers. Let us denote
by z(1   ), y(1   ), b(1   ) average reported income, productive earnings, and bargained
earnings across all taxpayers in the top bracket. We can then dene, as above, the real labor











We dene s, the fraction of the marginal behavioral response due to bargaining and by e3 = se
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This denition immediately implies that (y=z)e1 = (1 s)e. By construction, e = (y=z)e1+e3.
If we start from a situation where top taxpayers are paid their marginal product (y = z), then
we simply have e = e1 + e3 (in the same way as with the tax avoidance elasticity component
e2). Importantly, s (and hence e3) can be either positive or negative but it is always positive if
individuals are overpaid (i.e., if  > 1). If individuals are underpaid (i.e.,  < 1) then s (and
hence e3) can be negative, as long as  satises a condition described in the following Lemma,
the proof of which is straightforward.
18Lemma 1 We have:
s = 1  
e1









= e   e1  0:




If  > 1 then s > 0:
We can now state our main proposition.
Proposition 3 The optimal top tax rate is

 =
1 + a  e3
1 + a  e
= 1  
a(y=z)e1
1 + a  e
; (5)
where e = (y=z)e1 + e3 is the total elasticity of taxable income, e1 = [(1   )=y]dy=d(1   ) =
(z=y)(1   s)e is the real labor supply elasticity, and e3 = s  e = [(1   )=z]db=d(1   ) is the
compensation bargaining elasticity component.
 decreases with e (keeping e3 constant) and increases with e3 (keeping e constant). 
decreases with the real elasticity e1 (keeping e and y=z constant) and increases with the level of
overpayment  = z=y (keeping e1 and e constant)
If e1 = 0 then  = 1.
If z  y (top earners are overpaid) then  > 1=(1 + a  e1)
Proof: The government aims at maximizing taxes collected from the top bracket. Taxes
collected from the top bracket are [z   z] but the top bracket tax rate  also impacts E (b) and
hence the government budget (as the government absorbs one-to-one any change in E (b)). Since
the total size of the population is N (recall top earners are of measure one), the government
chooses  to maximize:
T = [y(1   ) + b(1   )    z]   N  E(b);
Importantly, if d triggers a change in b in the top bracket, that change is then reected one-
to-one in NE (b). Hence we have db=d(1   ) = NdE(b)=d(1   ) and the rst order condition
for  is:



































which can be rearranged into (5) using the fact that e3 = se. The rest of the proposition is
straightforward. QED.
Proposition 3 shows that it is possible to obtain a simple optimal tax formula that nests the
standard model in the case e3 = 0 (no bargaining elasticity). Implementing the formula requires
knowing the total elasticity e and the bargaining elasticity component e3 dened as the fraction
of the behavioral response (at the margin) due to bargaining earnings changes. e3 can also be
indirectly be obtained by substraction from e using the real labor supply elasticity e1 and the
ratio of product to pay y=z. Hence, implementing the formula requires to be able to know not
only how compensation responds to tax changes but also how real economic product responds to
tax changes, which is considerably more dicult than estimating the standard taxable income
elasticity e.
Trickle-Up. In the case where top earners are overpaid relative to their productivity (z >
y), then s > 0 and hence e3 > 0 and the optimal top tax rate is higher than in the standard
model (i.e.,  > 1=(1 + a  e)). This corresponds to a \trickle-up" situation where a tax cut
on upper incomes shifts economic resources away from the bottom and toward the top. Those
eects can be quantitatively large. For example, if we assume that most of the surge in top
income shares in the United States has been driven by top rate tax cuts then e = 1 as we shall
see in Section 5.1. With a = 1:5 for the Unites States in recent years (Piketty and Saez, 2003),
the conventional model obtains an optimal top tax rate of  = 1=(1 + 1:5  1) = 40%, which is
about equal to the current top tax rate equal to 42.5% when including all taxes (Diamond and
Saez, 2011). However, if you assume that the real labor supply elasticity of top earners is only
0.5 (an upper bound based on standard labor supply estimates focusing on hours of work), and
that top earners in the United States are paid at their marginal product today (y = z), then
 = 1   1:5  0:5=(1 + 1:5) = 70% considerably larger than the conventional rate of 40%. As is
well known from the executive compensation literature (see e.g., Murphy 1999), US executives
20are paid signicantly more than executives in Japan or Continental Europe even controlling for
characteristics of the company. Hence, if we are further willing to assume that US top earners
are overpaid, for example paid twice as much as their actual product, then y=z = 0:5 and
 = 1   1:5  0:5  0:5=(1 + 1:5) = 85%. This discussion shows that bargaining eects, which are
plausible but not easy to measure, can substantially alter optimal tax policy recommendations.
We return to this issue when we present our empirical estimates of e1, e2 and e3 in section 5
below.
Trickle-Down. In the case where top earners are underpaid relative to their productivity
(z < y) then it is possible that s < 0 and hence e3 < 0 (see the Lemma), in which case the
optimal top tax rate is lower than in the standard model (i.e.,  < 1=(1+ae)). This corresponds
to a \trickle-down" situation where a tax cut on upper incomes also shifts economic resources
toward the bottom, as upper incomes work in part for the benet of lower incomes. Coming back
to the discussion above, another interpretation of the dierential in executive pay between the
United States vs. Japan and Continental Europe is that executives in Japan and Continental
Europe are underpaid relative to their product. Consider for example the case of Japan where
top income have not responded much to the substantial cuts in top marginal tax rates (Moriguchi
and Saez, 2008) so that e = :25 is a reasonable elasticity and a = 2. The conventional optimal
top tax rate would be  = 1=(1 + 2  :25) = 67%. Suppose further that e1 = :25 and that 
is rigid, with e = 0 as there might be little scope for bargaining for top executives in Japan,
perhaps because of rigid executive pay structures. Assume that y=z = 2, so that top earners
in Japan are paid only 50% of their product. Then, the optimal top tax rate would be only
 = 1   2  2  0:25=(1 + 2  :25) = 33%. In eect, the optimal top rate is so low because 50% of
upper incomes are transferred to the rest of society. In that context, it is particularly inecient
to discourage their labor supply. This again shows that it is critical to know the extent to which
upper earners are overpaid vs. underpaid in order to determine the optimal top tax rate.
Regulation vs. Taxation. We have taken as given the bargaining opportunities in the
economy. Conceivably, the government can aect bargaining opportunities through regulations.
A large literature in corporate nance analyzes whether regulations can impact executive com-
pensation (see e.g., Frydman and Jenter 2010 and Murphy 2011 for recent discussions). In a
reduced form way, regulations would impact the cost of bargaining ki() but our analysis of the
optimal tax would remain valid taking regulations are given.
21Ideally, as bargaining is a wasteful eort that shifts resources without any real productive
eect, the government would want to completely discourage it, so that pay would always be
equal to real economic product. In that case, bargaining eects disappear and we naturally
revert to the standard model. However, as long as some bargaining eects subside, our analysis
is relevant. We leave an optimal regulation analysis taking into account both benets and costs
of regulation versus taxation for future work.
Dierentiated Taxation. Conceivably, some economic sectors or industries might be more
prone to bargaining eects than others. For example, less competitive industries have higher
rents and hence more scope for bargaining eects. In that case, dierentiated tax rates across
industries could conceivably be desirable. The same argument calls for dierentiated tax rates
in the standard model if some sectors have a higher labor supply elasticity. In practice, there are
two important arguments against dierentiated taxation. First, it would be dicult to measure
bargaining eects for each sector. This uncertainty might allow the better paid lobbyists to
argue in favor of preferential tax rates for their industry. Second, dierentiated tax rates create
additional distortions if there are opportunities to shift income from one sector to another.
Non uniform external eects. We have made the key assumption that aggregate external
eects E (b) are spread in a uniform and lumpsum fashion among all individuals. That simplies
the formula as the social value of the external eect created by bargaining eects by the tax
change d is one-to-one. This is the case because the government can exactly undo the external
eect by simply shifting the schedule and adjusting the demogrant. In general, the external
eects will not be uniformly distributed. In that case, if a negative external eect is tilted
toward lower income earners, it has more social cost and the optimal tax rate would be higher
than formula (5). Conversely, if the external eect is tilted toward upper income earners, it has
less social cost and the optimal tax rate would be lower than formula (5).20
Charitable giving. Charitable giving is conceptually related to the bargaining model.
Charitable giving is equivalent to giving away a fraction of one's income to society. That
fraction responds to the tax rate as higher tax rates encourage charitable giving when charitable
contributions can be deducted from taxable income as in the United States (see Andreoni 2006
for a survey of the empirical literature). In other words, if compensation bargaining reects
20This is somewhat complicated by the fact that the external income is taxable (in the non-uniform case, the
government can no longer undo the external eect).
22greed, charitable giving reects altruism.21 Charitable giving also has an external eect on
society. If we make the assumption that the external eect of charitable giving is lumpsum and
uniformly distributed in the population, then formula (5) applies where e3=e is the fraction of
the taxable income elasticity due to charitable giving responses.
However, an important dierence between charitable giving and bargaining eects is that
charitable giving is observable and hence it is possible to subsidize charitable giving indepen-
dently of the income tax rate. As discussed above this is not possible for bargaining as the real
product is not directly observable by the government.
Putting the three elasticities together. We can also put the three elasticities together in
a single formula. If we have at the same time tax avoidance eects and compensation bargaining
eects, then we can write the total elasticity of taxable income e as the sum of three terms:
e = (y=z)e1 +e2 +e3. In case we start from a situation where there is no tax avoidance activity
and incomes are equal to marginal products, then y = z and we simply have: e = e1 + e2 + e3.
For a given tax rate t on sheltered income, we have:

 =
1 + t  a  e2 + a  e3
1 + a  e




1 + a  e3
1 + a  (e1 + e3)
If government puts a social welfare weight 0  g < 1 on marginal consumption of top earners
(relative to the average), then the optimal top rate formula becomes

 =
1   g + t  a  e2 + a  e3
1   g + a  e
5 Empirical Exploration and Policy Implications
In this section, we want to use our model to account for the evolution of top tax rates and
top incomes in OECD countries. We rst lay out in Section 5.1 the key empirical facts using
US evidence and then international evidence on top income shares gathered in the World Top
Incomes Database and top income tax rates. Next in Section 5.2, we lay out the various scenarios
that have been proposed to explain the key facts and their tax policy consequences.
21Ironically, both can happen in the same person such as the \Robber Barons" of the Gilded Age developing
monopoly power to extract rents and then bequeathing their fortunes to charitable causes.
235.1 Key Facts
US Evidence
US evidence is depicted in graphical form in Figure 2 and key estimates are presented in
Table 1. Panel A of Figure 2, taken from Piketty and Saez (2003) depicts the top 1% income
shares including realized capital gains (pictured with full diamonds) and excluding realized
capital gains (the empty diamonds).22 Both top income shares, whether including or excluding
realized capital gains, display an overall U-shape over the century. Panel A also displays (on
the right y-axis) the top marginal tax rate for the Federal individual income tax for ordinary
income (dashed line) and for long-term realized capital gains (dotted line). Two important
lessons emerge from this panel.
Considering rst the top income share excluding realized capital gains which corresponds
roughly to income taxed according to the regular progressive schedule, there is a clear negative
overall correlation between the top 1% income share and the top marginal tax rate: (a) the top
1% income share was high before the Great Depression when top tax rates were low (except for
a short period from 1917 to 1922), (b) the top 1% income share was consistently low between
1932 to 1980 when the top tax rate was uniformly high, (c) the top 1% income share has
increased signicantly since 1980 after the top tax rate has been greatly lowered. This clear
visual correlation suggests that the overall elasticity of reported incomes is high. For the recent
period that is of most interest for current policy debates, the top 1% income share more than
doubled from around 8% in the late 1970s to around 18% in last ve years, while the net-of-tax
(retention) rate increased from 30% (when the top marginal tax rate was 70%) to 65% (when
the top tax rate is 35%). If we attribute the entire surge in the top income share to the decline
in the top tax rate, this translates into an elasticity of top incomes with respect to the net-of-tax
rate around one, as shown in column (1), Panel A of Table 1. Column (1) of Panel B in Table
1 also shows a strong correlation between the net-of-tax rate and the top income share with a
basic time series regression of the form
log(Top 1% Income Share) = a + e  log(1   Top MTR) + "
22Those series are based on the family unit (and not the individual adult). Income includes cash market
income before individual taxes and credits, and excludes government transfers (such as Social Security benets,
unemployment insurance benets, or means-tested transfers) as well as non-cash benets (such as employer or
government provided health insurance).
24This link remains the same when including a linear time trend in the regression.23 The implied
elasticity is around 0.25-0.30 and very signicant. Importantly, as the average marginal tax rate
faced by the top 1% was smaller than the statutory top rate before the 1970s, our elasticity
estimate is likely to be downward biased.24
Second, the correlation between the top shares and the top tax rate also holds for the series
including capital gains. Realized capital gains have been traditionally tax favored (as illustrated
by the gap between the top tax rate and the tax rate on realized capital gains in the gure)
and have constituted the main channel for tax avoidance of upper incomes.25 Under the tax
avoidance scenario, taxable income subject to the progressive tax schedule should be much more
elastic than a broader income denition that also includes forms of income that are tax favored.
Indeed, in the pure tax avoidance scenario, total real income should be completely inelastic.
However, both the graphical analysis of Panel A and the estimates presented in Table 1, column
(2) show that the link between the top tax rate is as strong for income including realized capital
gains as it is for income excluding capital gains. The implied elasticity for the late 1970s vs.
today is slightly in excess of one for income including realized capital gains. The time series
regressions also generate virtually identical estimates as the series excluding capital gains. This
suggests that income shifting responses do not account for much of the evolution in top income
shares documented in Figure 2.26 In the short-run, to be sure, there is strong evidence on
Panel A of large tax avoidance responses in various tax reform episodes with clear dierential
responses for top incomes including vs. excluding realized capital gains.27 But in the long run
23Naturally, the correlation disappears when additional polynomials in time are added as identication is
based solely on time variations.
24The solution would be to instead use the actual average marginal tax rate faced by the top 1% instrumented
with the top marginal tax rate (as in Saez, 2004). Unfortunately, actual top 1% marginal tax rate series are not
available before 1960 and would be very time consuming to construct.
25When individual top tax rates are high (relative to corporate and realized capital gains tax rates), it becomes
more advantageous for upper incomes to organize their business activity using the corporate form and retain
prots in the corporation. Prots only show up on individual returns as realized capital gains when the corporate
stock is eventually sold. See e.g., Vickrey (1947) for an early analysis and Gordon and Slemrod (2000) for a
more modern analysis, yet strikingly similar in its conclusions.
26In future work, it would be useful to sharpen this test by (a) subtracting deductions{such as charitable
giving or interest paid on debt{from the narrow income denition to come closer to taxable income, (b) adding
forms of income that are non-taxable{such as tax exempt interest, capital gains unrealized till death, or fringe
benets to further broaden the broader income denition. There is no easy route to do this as most of those
items are not reported consistently and continuously in income tax statistics (Fack and Landais (2008) have
constructed homogeneous series for charitable giving).
27For example, in 1986, realized capital gains surged in anticipation of the increase in the capital gains tax rate
from 20 to 28% (Auerbach (1988)), a clear spike in the series including capital gains in the Figure. From 1986 to
1988, income excluding realized capital gains surged as closely held businesses shifted from the corporate form
to the individual form, and as many business owners paid themselves accumulated prots as wages and salaries
25the income shifting elasticity e2 (as estimated long the ordinary income vs capital gains margin)
appears to be small (say, e2 < 0:1).
Clearly, capital gains are not the only channel through which income avoidance can occur.
O-shore accounts and perquisites also come to mind. However, if anything, it seems that those
have increased at the same time as top rates have declined. For the former channel, Zucman
(2011) for example shows that a growing fraction of Swiss duciary deposits are recorded as
belonging to tax havens since the 1970s. For the latter, it is notoriously hard to nd historical
data, as disclosure rules for perquisites have only recently been imposed28 but perquisites would
have had to be huge pre-1970 to generate a high elasticity of avoidance through that channel.
Indeed, there is both anecdotal29 and more rigorous evidence on the high level of perks today
(Yermack (2006), Grinstein, Weinbaum and Yehuda (2008)), which are several times the $0.74
million median total pay of top executives pre-1970s (Frydman and Saks (2010)). Despite the
lack of data, it is hard to believe that perks could possibly have been so high in the past.
The most dicult question to resolve is whether this large responsiveness of top incomes
to tax rates is due to supply side eects generating more economic activity as in the standard
model of Section 2 or whether it is due to a zero-sum game transfer from the bottom 99% to
the top 1% as in the bargaining model of Section 4. This is the critical question to decompose
the total elasticity e into e1 and e3 eects. Panel B of Figure 2 tries to cast preliminary light on
this issue by plotting the evolution of top 1% incomes and bottom 99% incomes adjusting for
price ination.30 The graph shows clearly that income growth for the bottom 99% was highest
(Slemrod (1996), Saez (2004)). Such shifting increased reported ordinary income at the expense of realized
capital gains, explaining why there is a big discontinuity in income excluding realized capital gains but not in
income including realized capital gains. Finally, there is a clear surge in incomes in 1992 in anticipation of the
increase in the top tax rate on ordinary income in 1993 due to re-timing in the exercise of stock-options for
executives (Goolsbee (2000)). See Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2011) for a much more detailed discussion.
28Regulation introduced in December, 1978 required rms to disclose only the total amount of remuneration
distributed in the form of securities or property, insurance benets or reimbursement, and personal benets.
Only in 1993 were perquisites and other personal benets (above a minimum threshold) separately reported.
Even then, the data poses problems in terms of transparency and accuracy.
29For example, research rm Morningstar reports that Diller, CEO of Expedia spent a combined 1.3 million
on personal ights in 2010, almost twice the pre-1970 total CEO pay. D.Blankenship, former CEO of Massey
Energy received as post-employment perks a secretary for 5 years, two year health care benets, a two-year
consulting contract, a house and free company land. The New York Times ('From Coee to Jets, Perks for
Executives Come Out in Court', Feb 22 2004) reports that two of Tyco International's executives got paid their
children's tuition fees, a $1 million birthday party in Sardinia, as well as the now infamous $6,000 shower curtain
and $15,000 umbrella stand.
30To control for changes in the number of adults per family, we plot income per adult (aged 20 and over)
assuming that the top 1% income share at the individual adult level is the same as at the family level. This
assumption holds true in countries such as Canada where top income shares can be constructed both at the
individual and family levels (Saez and Veall, 2005).
26in the 1933 to 1973 period when top income tax rates were high and the growth of top 1% was
modest. Conversely, the growth of bottom 99% incomes has slowed down since the 1970s when
top tax rates came down and top 1% incomes grew very fast. Those graphical impressions can
be captured by a basic regression analysis of the form:
log(Real Incomegt) = a + b  log(1   Top MTRt) + c  t + "
where g indexes either the Bottom 99% or the Top 1% or the overall average income and t denotes
the year. We naturally control for time to capture overall exogenous growth independent of tax
policy. The estimate b, reported in Table 2 Panel C, is positive and highly signicant for the top
1% incomes, with a magnitude around .25 very similar to the time series elasticity estimation
of Panel B. In contrast, the estimate b is negative (and just signicant at the 5% level with a
t-stat around 2) for the bottom 99%, and close to zero and insignicant for the overall average
income. Again, the estimates are very similar for income excluding capital gains in column (1)
and for income including capital gains in column (2).
This evidence is consistent with the bargaining model where gains at the top have come at
the expense of the bottom. In principle, the estimate b obtained for the overall average income
can be used to compute e1. I.e. if the model is well identied we have: b =   e1, where  is
the initial income share of top marginal tax rate taxpayers. That is, if we take  = 10%,31 then
a doubling of the net-of-top-marginal-tax-rate should lead to a b = 10% rise in the average real
income of the economy if the real supply side elasticity e1 was 1. But since we nd that b is
close to zero and insignicant for the overall average income, it is tempting to conclude that e1
is also small and insignicant, and that the overall elasticity e comes mostly from bargaining
eects through e3.
Note also that this evidence can also be used to rule out the possibility of signicant un-
recorded tax avoidance eects. That is, assume that in the 1950s-1970s top income earners were
escaping high top rates via consumption within the rm (counted as intermediate consumption
within corporations -fancy restaurants, corporate jets, etc. - and therefore unrecorded in GDP
estimates) or tax havens (again unrecorded in GDP estimates, at least partly).32 If such tax
31The exact fraction of taxpayers falling in the top marginal rate bracket varies over time. In recent decades,
it is generally larger than the top 1% (it is often closer to the top 2%-3%), so  = 10% should be viewed as a
lower bound (implying that the estimates for e1 should be viewed as upper bounds).
32Other forms of tax avoidance such as deferred compensation or legal income shifting would be recorded in
GDP.
27avoidance had declined signicantly in the recent period, then this should show up as extra eco-
nomic growth. I.e. in presence of such unrecorded tax avoidance activities, then the estimate b
obtained for the overall average income should actually be equal to: b =   (e1 + e2). In any
case, this suggests that the overall elasticity e comes mostly from e3 eects.
However, this evidence relies on the strong OLS assumption that any deviation of growth
from trend (captured by the error term ") is uncorrelated with the top marginal tax rate. It is
conceivable that economic growth could have slowed down in the 1970s for reasons unrelated
to the top tax rate decreases. This could have driven down the bottom 99% income growth as
well. In that case, the cut in top tax rates could have increased top incomes growth as in the
supply side scenario without negatively impacting bottom 99% incomes. Indeed, growth slowed
down in many OECD countries after the oil shocks of the 1970s. Therefore, this evidence based
on a single country is at best suggestive. Hence, to make further progress, we now turn to
international evidence.
International Evidence
To analyze international evidence, we use data on the income shares of the top 1% from 18
OECD countries, gathered in the World Top Incomes Database combined with top income tax
rate data since 1975. We focus on the period since 1975 because this allows us to include more
countries (a number of countries in the top income database have data only for recent decades)
and to gather top tax rate data relatively easily. In addition, focus on the recent period is
interesting because of the very divergent trends across countries in both top income shares and
top tax rates.33 Our top income tax rates series include both the central and local government
top tax rates on ordinary income. We do not include payroll taxes as those taxes apply only to
wage earnings which constitute only a fraction of top 1% incomes and are often capped. We do
not include consumption taxes either.34 We provide complete details on the construction of top
tax rates and on the variables' construction in Appendix C. Top incomes are dened as cash
market income excluding capital gains and subject to the regular income tax (see Atkinson and
Piketty 2007, 2010 volumes for complete country level details).
33Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom (2009) have used the database to explain the long-run determinants of
inequality over the full century, including the top tax rate as an explanatory variable among many others. They
present overall regressions without focusing specically on the recent decades as we do here.
34As a robustness check, we have constructed and done the analysis including all uncapped payroll and
consumption taxes as well. The results were very similar and available from the authors upon request.
28We start in Figure 3 by showing the link between the top tax rate (on the x-axis) and the
top 1% income share (on the y-axis) for 1975-9 (Panel A) and 2004-8 (Panel B) across countries.
If the country does not have data for those years, we select the rst available ve years after
1975 and the most recent 5 years (also described in Appendix C). Panel A shows that there
was a very wide dispersion in top tax rates across OECD countries in the late 1970s with rates
as low as 40% for Spain and Switzerland and above 75% for Sweden, the United Kingdom, or
Japan. The United States had fairly high top tax rates, around 70%, signicantly above those
of France and Germany. Top 1% income shares were uniformly fairly modest with a maximum
just above 10% for Germany and a minimum slightly below 5% for Sweden and Denmark. The
graph shows that there was a weak negative correlation between top shares and top tax rates.
Panel A1 in Table 2 conrms that the implied elasticity obtained from regressing the log of the
top income share on the log of the net-of-tax rate across those 18 countries is around .33 and
only marginally signicant.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows a dramatic shift by 2004-8. Top tax rates are much lower than they
were in the late 1970s with no country above 60% and a number of countries clustering around
40% including the United States, or the United Kingdom. There is also much more heterogeneity
in top income shares which vary from a low of 4% for Denmark to a high of almost 18% for the
United States. Importantly, there is also a much stronger negative correlation between top tax
rates and top income shares in 2004-8 than in 1975-9. As reported in Table 2, Panel A1, the
implied elasticity for 2004-8 is extremely large around 1.40 and highly signicant.
In order to extend the 1970s vs. today comparison we did for the United States to our
18 OECD countries, Panel A of Figure 4 plots the change in top income shares from 1975-
9 to 2004-8 (on the y-axis) against the change in the top marginal tax rate (on the x-axis)
for all the countries. The gure shows a very clear and strong correlation between the cut
in top tax rates and the increase in the top 1% income share with interesting heterogeneity.
Countries such as France, Germany, Spain, Denmark or Switzerland which did not experience
any signicant top rate tax cut did not experience changes in top income shares. Among the
countries which experienced signicant top rate cuts, some experience a large increase in top
income shares (all 5 English speaking countries but also Norway and Finland) while others
experience only modest increases in top income shares (Japan, Italy, Sweden, Portugal, or the
Netherlands). Interestingly, no country experiences a signicant increase in top income shares
29without implementing signicant top rate tax cuts.
This graph provides two lessons. First, it shows a very strong link between top tax rates and
top income shares. The implied elasticity reported in Table 2, Panel A2 using a regression of the
log-change in top income shares on the log-change in the net-of-tax rate over those 18 countries
generates a fairly large and highly signicant elasticity around .5. Additional regressions in
Panel A3 using the complete time series of the form
log(Top 1% Income : Shareit) = a + e  log(1   Top MTRit) + "it
also generate estimates around .5, and are robust to the introduction of an overall time trend
or country xed eects.35 Second, the implied elasticity varies signicantly across countries
with strong eects in English speaking countries, and particularly the United States where the
elasticity is around one,36 and much more modest eects in other countries such as Japan,
Sweden, or Italy, where the elasticity is only around .2. This suggests that the elasticity likely
depends on the institutional set-up of each country.
To tell apart the supply side vs. the bargaining scenario, Panel B of Figure 4 plots the
annual real GDP per capita growth from 1975-9 to 2004-8 (on the y-axis) against the change in
the top marginal tax rate (on the x-axis) for all the countries. Under the supply-side scenario, a
cut in top rates translates into additional economic activity among upper incomes, hence higher
top income shares but also higher economic growth. In contrast, under the bargaining scenario,
a cut in top tax rates generates a \trickle-up" transfer from lower to upper incomes with an
increase in top income shares but no additional economic activity.
The graph displays no visible correlation between the change in top tax rates and growth
rates. The countries experiencing the largest increases in top income shares (United States,
United Kingdom, or Canada) have growth rates that are comparable to those of France, Ger-
many, or Denmark who did not experience any signicant top rate cuts and top income share
increases. Panel B of Table 2 provides additional regression evidence using the complete time
35Estimates using both country and time xed eects generate smaller elasticities as they rely on year-to-year
variation for identication. Our analysis focuses instead on long-run eects of top tax rates.
36Canada has an even larger implied elasticity but as argued by Saez and Veall (2005), part of the surge
in Canadian top income shares might have been driven by brain drain threats following the surge in US top
compensation rather than internal Canadian tax policy.
30series and specications of the form:
log(Real GDP per Capitait) = a + b  log(1   Top MTRit) + c  t + "it
with: b =   e1
Both regressions excluding or including country xed eects do not reveal any signicant eect
of the top tax rate on real GDP per capita.37 The magnitude and precision of the estimates
also rule out large eects. For example, doubling the retention rate (as done in the US for top
incomes since 1980) would only increase GDP per capita by .1 percentage point in the case of
the estimate with xed eects. If we take  = 10%, as in the previous sub-section, and an
absolute upper bound b = 0:2 (accounting for the standard errors), then assuming that these
regressions are properly identied we can exclude the possibility of a real supply side elasticity
e1 larger than 0:2. Given that the overall elasticity e is about 0:5, this would suggest that the
compensation bargaining elasticity e3 is at least 0:3.38 Importantly and as mentioned above, as
the top statutory rates in 1970s sometimes applied to less than the top 1%, the average marginal
tax rate eectively faced by the top 1% was likely smaller than the statutory top rate. Hence
our elasticity estimate e and the growth eect b are likely to be biased downward, but by the
same factor so that the ratio of the two estimates should be unbiased. All this tends to imply
that e1 is at most 40% of the total elasticity.
Naturally, those regressions are only suggestive as they rely on a very strong identifying
assumption: any deviation of GDP growth from its trend (not due to top tax rate factors) is
uncorrelated with the evolution of top tax rates.39 The goal of this analysis is not to provide
full-edged evidence of the bargaining scenario but rather to show that, a rst pass macro-level
37We have also run regressions using GDP per adult, GDP per working age adult, or GDP per worked hour.
In all cases, we nd small and insignicant eects.
38As was noted above, in the presence of unrecorded tax avoidance eects e2 we would have b = (e1 + e2),
in which case e1 + e2 < 0:2. In any case, this corresponds to an elasticity e3 of at least 0:3.
39Many potential factors could invalidate this assumption. For example, if countries cut top tax rates when
their growth is expected to slow down (for example if Anglo-Saxon countries during the 1970s feared to be
overtaken by Continental Europe and Japan, and opted for the Thatcher-Reagan revolution as a way to ght
relative decline), that would generate a spurious negative correlation between growth and the net-of-tax top rate
- thereby implying that then elasticity e1 is under-estimated (one would however have to explain the reason for
this structural decline). Factors going in the other direction include the voluntary reduction in working hours
that took place in a number of Continental European countries since the 1970s-1980s - which in principle should
have reduced their growth performance relatively to Anglo-Saxon countries with long working hours. It could
also be that there exists a spurious positive correlation between top income growth and net-of-tax top rates
(both being caused by changing social norms and beliefs about top end inequality), thereby implying that we
are overestimating the total elasticity e:
31analysis does not reject the non-conventional bargaining model in favor of the standard model
used in tax analysis.
At the same time, there is ample direct micro evidence in favor of a bargaining view of top
earners', and especially CEOs', compensation (see Frydman and Jenter (2010), Section 4, for a
good summary of both sides of the debate). First, parts of compensation packages are hidden
from shareholders which should not be the case if pay was set competitively (Bebchuk and Fried
(2004), Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2009)). Consequently, new disclosure rules almost certainly lead to
an increase in reported earnings. Secondly, CEOs frequently receive rewards for good outcomes
that are not the result of their own eort (but instead for example, of a booming economy) and
are not symmetrically punished for unlucky events (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Garvey
and Milbourn (2006)). CEOs do better when there is a lack of competition, since their pay
increases following reductions in a takeover threat (Bertrand and Mullainathan (1998)). On the
other hand, their compensation decreases after regulatory changes aimed at improving board
control (Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009)). Furthermore, there is widespread malpractice in
compensation setting which seems to indicate rent-extraction. For example, 30% of rms from
1996 to 2005 seem to have used `options backdating' (which consists in choosing the \grant
dates" ex-post to allow for the minimal strike price of at-the-money options) (Lie (2005), Heron
and Lie (2007, 2009), Narayanan and Seyhun (2008)). Bebchuk et. al (2010) further show that
this practice occurred more in rms with weak boards. Another practice suggestive of rent-
extraction is spring loading (Yermack (1997)) which happens when CEOs are awarded options
right before the release of positive news. Finally, it is also possible that the increased use of
stock options, has helped managers to disguise their increased rent extraction, since few people
might have thoroughly understood option valuation (Hall and Murphy (2003), Bebchuk and
Fried (2004)).
5.2 Scenarios
We can now bring together our theoretical and empirical analysis to evaluate the plausibility
and policy consequences of each of the key scenarios we outlined in introduction that have been
put forward to explain the surge in top incomes in recent decades. Those scenarios and tax
implications are summarized in Table 3.
(0) Skill-Biased Technological Change This scenario posits that technological progress
32has been skill-biased and has favored top earners relative to average earners. The labor eco-
nomics literature has debated the merits of the skill-biased hypothesis (see Katz and Autor, 1999
for a survey). In the case of top earners, this hypothesis takes the form of \Winner-Takes-All"
theories whereby highly talented individuals can deploy their skills on a broader and worldwide
market, hence increasing the marginal product of any given unit of talent. Gabaix and Landier
(2008) propose a model of the market for CEOs along those lines. The theory of skill-biased
technological progress is largely independent of behavioral responses to taxation.
As we have seen, this scenario cannot explain why only some OECD countries have experi-
enced a surge in top income shares and why that surge has been highly correlated with the drop
in top marginal tax rates. Indeed, all OECD countries have been subject to similar techno-
logical and globalization forces and hence should have experienced the same change in income
concentration under the basic skill-biased technological change scenario.
(1) Supply Side Tax Eects (e1). This scenario posits that the drop in top tax rates has
led to an increase in top income shares through a standard supply side eect whereby highly
skilled individuals work and earn more. In this case, the standard model is valid and there is no
avoidance nor bargaining elasticity. If this scenario is correct, then we can interpret the overall
cross-country elasticity e = 0:5 as deriving from standard supply side eects: e = e1 = 0:5 and
e2 = e3 = 0. With a = 1:5 (the Pareto coecient currently prevailing in the U.S.), the top tax
rate maximizing tax revenue would then be  = 1=(1+ae) = 57% (see Table 3). With a = 2:0
(prevailing in many European countries), the top tax rate maximizing tax revenue would be
only  = 50%. This is less than the current top tax rate (combining all taxes) currently applied
in a number of European countries. Hence, decreasing top tax rates would be a desirable policy
both from the point of view of top earners but also from the point of view of the bottom 99%
as taxes collected from upper incomes would increase. This would also imply that the high top
US tax rates of the 1970s were set well above the revenue maximizing rate.
However, this scenario creates three major diculties. First, it somewhat strains credibility
to believe that top 1% earners in the U.S. had enough leeway to be able to drastically increase
their work eort. Any objective measure of labor supply such as hours of work or those based
on retirement behavior does not show any such large increase.40
40For example, Mott and Wilelhm (2000) show that, while top incomes surged after the Tax Reform Act of
1986, hours of work of top earners measured in the Survey of Consumer Finances did not change.
33Second, the link between the surge in top income shares and top rate cuts is not perfect.
Some countries, such as Japan, have cut their top tax rates about as much as the United States
and yet have experienced no surge in top shares. This suggests that the behavioral response to
taxes might depend on the tax system and institutions rather than on some universal preferences
on work and leisure.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the supply side scenario implies that the surge in top incomes
is due to additional economic activity and does not come at the expense of lower incomes.
Therefore, countries who cut their top tax rates should have experienced more economic growth
than other countries a prediction that is not borne out by a simple cross-country comparison.
The critical problem with the supply-side scenario is simply that the United States or the United
Kingdom did not experience signicantly higher economic growth than Germany or France or
Japan since the 1970s. On the basis of these cross-country comparisons, a large e1 does not
seem plausible and it is likely that e1  0:2.
(2) Tax Avoidance Eects (e2) This scenario posits that the link between top income
shares and top tax rates is due to a large avoidance elasticity. When tax rates are high, top
income earners nd ways to exploit loopholes and report less of their taxable income. As shown
in the survey by Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2011), there is indeed evidence that income shifting
responses{where shifting can occur either over time or across tax bases{can be important in
the short-run whenever such tax avoidance opportunities are created by tax changes. This tax
avoidance channel was rst presented as a left-wing critique of the supply-side scenario, since
part of the extra individual income tax came at the expense of tax revenues from other tax
bases or other time periods. More recently, this tax avoidance argument has been used to deny
that any real increase in US income inequality has taken place (Reynolds (2007)).
Under this scenario, the avoidance elasticity is large while the standard supply side elasticity
is modest. Under the current US tax regime with its existing loopholes, the optimal tax rate
should be  = (1+tae2)=(1+ae). It is dicult to estimate t accurately but tax avoidance
exploits primarily deferral and the favorable treatment of capital gains, so that a marginal tax
rate t of 20% is perhaps reasonable. If we assume e = 0:5, e1 = 0:2, e2 = 0:3, e3 = 0, a = 1:5
and t = 20%, then we get  = 62% which is somewhat larger than the 57% optimal tax
arising from the pure supply side scenario due to the \scal externality" (see Table 3). More
importantly however, the deeper policy implication is that one needs to rst close tax avoidance
34opportunities, in order to reduce the shifting elasticity and only then increase the top tax rate.41
As shown in Table 3, if the government can broaden the base and reduce the avoidance elasticity
from 0.3 to 0.1, then the optimal top tax rate increases to 71%.
The weakness of the tax avoidance scenario is that taxable income subject to the progressive
tax schedule should be much more elastic than a broader income denition that also includes
forms of income that are tax favored. Our US long-run analysis rejects this scenario as we
found that income including realized capital gains is exactly as elastic as income excluding
them, using a full century long data series. Our US and cross-country analysis also seem to
reject the possibility of large unrecorded tax avoidance eects.
(3) Compensation Bargaining Eects (e3) Under this scenario, the high top tax rates
of the 1970s were part of the institutional setup putting a brake on top compensation through
bargaining or rent extraction eects. Lower top tax rates induces top earners to bargain more
aggressively for higher pay.
Under this scenario the bargaining elasticity is large while the supply side (and avoidance)
elasticities are modest. The optimal tax rate is sensitive to (a) how large the supply side
elasticity is, (b) whether top earners are overpaid vs. underpaid. If the supply side elasticity
is very small, then the optimal top tax rate will be large (100% in the limit where there is
no supply side elasticity). If the supply side elasticity is not large and top earners are not
underpaid, then the optimal top tax rate is also high. The optimal top tax rate will not be
high only if the supply elasticity is large and top earners are underpaid (since then it would be
desirable to induce top earners to work harder for the benet of others).
The main diculty with this scenario is that it is dicult to obtain compelling direct evidence
that the surge in top incomes did come at the expense of lower earners. The US evidence over a
century is consistent with this scenario. International evidence since 1975 is also consistent with
this scenario. From this evidence, the most reasonable estimates would be e = 0:5, e1 = 0:2 (at
most), e2 = 0:0, e3 = 0:3 (at least), which together with a = 1:5 would imply  = 83% (see
Table 3). Of course these estimates are far from being well identied. But they illustrate the
critical importance of the decomposition of the overall elasticity into three elasticities.
As mentioned above, the fact that the overall elasticity seems to vary across countries,
41The study of Kopczuk (2005) convincingly shows that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in the United States was
indeed successful in reducing the elasticity of taxable income with base broadening and loopholes closing.
35being high in English speaking countries and small in Continental Europe or Japan, could also
mean that the bargaining elasticity depends on the country's institutional setup. Presumably,
in Europe or Japan, it might still be dicult for top executives to bargain for higher pay
even though top tax rates are no longer very high. In contrast, it is conceivable that in the
United States and the United Kingdom, the Reagan and Thatcher conservative revolutions also
weakened other institutional barriers to top pay such as Unions or social intolerance for pay
inequality.
6 Conclusion
Our paper has analyzed the problem of optimal taxation of top labor incomes by considering
three channels of behavioral responses to taxation: (1) the standard supply-side channel through
reduced work eort, (2) the tax avoidance channel of income shifting for tax minimization pur-
poses, (3) the compensation bargaining channel through eorts in inuencing own pay setting.
We have derived simple optimal top tax rate formulas as a function of the three elasticities cor-
responding to those three channels of responses. We have shown that the models generate very
dierent predictions for the optimal top marginal tax rate. Outside of the standard supply-side
mode, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate is no longer a sucient
statistics. Hence, it is critical to understand the channel of the behavioral responses. Our rst
pass empirical analysis looking at US and international top income shares and top tax rates
shows that there is a strong link between top tax rates and top income shares implying that
the overall elasticity is large. Even though the data are consistent with the bargaining eect
scenario, it is dicult to compellingly distinguish empirically the standard supply-side channel
from the compensation bargaining channel, let alone evaluate to what extent top earners are
overpaid vs. underpaid relative to their product. We hope that future research using a more
micro-approach and more credible identication sources will make progress on this key issue.
Our paper has focused primarily on the case where the government sets a zero social marginal
welfare weight on top earners. This is useful to determine the upper bound revenue maximizing
tax rate on upper incomes. In reality, the welfare weight put on top earners by society is likely to
depend on perceptions of whether top pay is fair or not. In the supply side scenario, pay is fair by
denition and hence a zero weight can only be justied by strong redistributive motives{which
might hold in some but not all OECD countries. In the tax avoidance scenario, the public might
36perceive upper incomes as taking unfair advantage of the tax system and hence this might lower
the marginal welfare weight that society puts on top earners. Finally, in the bargaining model,
if top earners are overpaid at the expense of lower paid workers, then top pay would naturally be
considered as unfair and that could translate into a very low social welfare weight on top earners
as the rich would be perceived as undeserving.42 Indeed, one of the central argument in the recent
\Occupy Wall Street" protests in the United States is that pay going to the top 1% is unfair
because it has come at the expense of the remaining 99% percent. Historically, the perception
of unfair pay at the top has certainly played a key role in the development of very progressive
taxation in the rst part of the 20th century in most advanced countries that we documented
in Figure 1.43 Therefore, social perceptions are likely to further widen the dierences in the
socially desired level of top earners taxation across the dierent models relative to our analysis
with zero welfare weights. It is also possible that higher income shares raise the ability of top
income groups to inuence social perceptions (e.g. by funding think tanks or medias that are
more pro-rich), thereby creating some reverse causality between income inequality, perceptions
and policies. Economists can play a key role in enlightening those perceptions by evaluating
empirically which economic model of top incomes determination accounts best for the facts.
42In contrast, if top earners are perceived as being underpaid relative to their contributions, they would
naturally be seen as a deserving group working in part for the benets of others, and hence could have a high
social welfare weight.
43See Brownlee (2004) for a US political history of Federal taxation and Piketty (2001) for a historical analysis
in the case of France.
37A Proof of Proposition 2
Let us now consider again the tax rates L, K that maximize tax revenue raised from the top
bracket earners (recall that top bracket earners are of measure 1).
T = L[yL(1   L)   x(L   K)    z] + K[yK(1   K) + x(L   K)]
The rst order conditions with respect to L and K are:










which, using  = L   K, can be rewritten as:
















Taking the dierence of those two equations, we can express  as
 = L   K =
(zL    z)=y0
L   zK=y0
K




Hence, as the denominator is always positive,
 > 0 ,
















zL    z
:
Introducing eK = (1   K)y0
K=yK, eL = (1   L)y0
L=yL, and aL = zL=(zL    z), we can rewrite
this condition as:











Recall that  = L   K, zK = yK + x(), zL = yL   x(), hence we have





1   K   
:
As x() > 0 i  > 0, we have  > 0 ) eK > aLeL. Conversely,  < 0 implies x() < 0




1 K  < aLeL. Finally,  = 0 ) eK = aLeL. Hence, we
have:
 S 0 , eK S aLeL:
We can rewrite the rst order conditions as
L
1   L




yKeK = zK +   x
0
Hence if aLeL < eK then  > 0 and hence eLL=(1 L)  (zL  z)=yL = [(zL  z)=zL]zL=yL =
[yL   x()]=(yLaL)  1=aL which implies L  1=(1 + aLeL). Similarly, eKK=(1   K) 
zK=yK = (yK +x())=yK  1 which implies K  1=(1+eK). This completes the proof of the
general case.
If x  x0  0 then yK = zK and yL = zL and the rst order conditions above immediately
imply that L = 1=(1 + aL  eL) and K = 1=(1 + eK)
If x0 is very large relative to y0
L and y0
K, then the expression above for  implies that  ' 0






yKeK = zL + zK    z = yL + yK    z;











a   e
;
as a = (zK + zL)=(zK + zL    z) = (yK + yL)=(yK + yL    z) which completes the proof of the
third part of the proposition. QED
B A Simple Bargaining Model
In this appendix, we present a very simple micro-founded model that is consistent with our
bargaining eect specication in Section 4, i.e., with a payo of the type:
u
i (c;;y) =   y   T (  y)   hi (y)   ki ()   E (b) (6)
where, as in the main text, y is productive output,  is the factor by which income is scaled
up or down through bargaining, T () is the nonlinear tax schedule with a lump-sum demogrant
T (0); hi (y) the cost of producing output, and ki () the cost of bargaining. All agents were
assumed to bear the cost of the average bargaining in the economy,  E (b) uniformly. The goal
is simply to show that it is possible to propose a micro-foundation for the formulation in (6).
For simplicity, and to be able to focus exclusively on the bargaining channel, we abstract from
the intensive labor supply margin.
Consider an economy made out of rms and N workers. Workers are engaged in a search
for jobs with matching frictions, as in Pissarides (2000) which lasts for only one period. At the
beginning of the period, all workers start in the unemployed state and rms open vacancies at a
cost c. The number of vacancies is determined in equilibrium by the free-entry condition. Given
the N unemployed workers and V vacancies, there are M = m(N;V ) matches formed, where
m() is a standard constant returns to scale matching function. Denote by  = V
N the market






be the probability that a vacancy is lled (note
also that q () is the probability that a worker nds a job). We further assume that each of
the N workers in the economy owns a fraction 1
N of every rm.
Once a rm and a worker match, they determine the worker's pay, w; by engaging in Nash
bargaining over the surplus of the match. Workers are indexed by i and have heterogeneous
productivities i so that output is simply yi = i. Let J be the expected value of a lled
vacancy for a rm which is given by:
J = E (   w) (7)
The free entry condition then implies that:
c = q ()J (8)
Let Wi denote the value of employment for a worker of type i, which in our static case is simply
equal to the wage:
Wi = wi (9)
If bargaining breaks down, the worker receives an exogenous outside option w0i, and the rm
gets  c. Denoting by i and (1   i) the (potentially heterogeneous) bargaining weights of






subject to (7) and (9).
From the rst-order conditions we have that:
Wi   w0i = i (Wi + Ji   w0i) = i (i   w0i)
So that the wage equation is:
wi = (1   i)w0i + ii
Furthermore, we assume that the outside option is proportional to the worker's productivity
(for example because more productive people can better start their own business, immigrate
abroad for a higher wage, etc..), so that wi0 = ii. Thus we can rewrite the wage equation as:
wi = ii
where i = (1   i)i + i. Hence, we nd that zi = yi as in the main text. Note that if the
worker has suciently high bargaining power (i.e., i is high enough) and the outside option
is very attractive, then it is possible to have i  1 even though both i and i are less than
1, so that the worker can earn more than his marginal product i.44 Suppose that in order to
44However, on average, the expected prot of the rm conditional on having found a match (J in equation
(7)) is positive, so as to compensate the rm for opening the costly vacancy.
40aect i, the worker needs to incur a certain cost ki (i). Also note that there are potentially
two channels through which i can be changed, namely the pure bargaining weight i and the
outside option i:45
In addition, the number of vacancies is implicitly determined in equilibrium by the equation:
c
q ()
= E ((1   i)i)
where the expectation is over all workers. The rm employing worker i receives a prot, denoted
i :
i = (1   i)(i   w0i) = (1   i)i




Iii   V c =
N X
i=1
Ii (1   i)i   V c
where Ii is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if worker i is has found a match and is
employed. Each worker receives 1
N from his rm portfolio. Let bi = (i   1)i denote the













Thus, a worker receives from his rm ownership: 
N =  E (b)   V
Nc where E (b) denotes the
average bargaining in the economy, where the use of the expectation operator is a slight abuse of
notation.46 We can ignore the last constant V
Nc which can be fully absorbed by the demogrant
transfers in our model. Hence, we obtain equation (6) that we used in the main text.
C Data Sources
C.1 Tax Data
Income tax data (at the national and local level), as well as payroll taxes on employer and
employee, come mainly from the OECD annual \Taxing Wages" publication which covers the
45We could alternatively have taken i = 0 and let all the bargaining eect go through the Nash bargaining
weight :
46Note that by the free-entry condition, in expectation J = E (   w) =  E (b) = c V
M so that the expected






 0 which means that on average, workers are underpaid conditional on matching
(to allow the rm to recoup the costs of their vacancies in expectation). However, for any realization of the
matching process, and depending on which workers get matched, 
N could be either negative or positive. The
government demogrant will capture it in any case. In addition, it leaves open the possibility that all top earners
are overpaid (have a positive b) and that all others are underpaid (have a negative b) and that on average prots
remain positive conditional on matching.
41period from the early 1980s to the present. For the period 1975-1983 taxes are summarized in
the publication \Personal income tax systems for the period 1975-1983." Consumption tax data
comes from the OECD publications \Consumption Tax Trends" (for 2010, 2008, 2006, 2004,
2001, 1999) which summarize consumption taxes since 1975. For specic countries, additional
sources were used.
United States: Federal tax parameters from the Tax Policy Center. The average state tax rate
is estimated using actual top statutory state income tax rates weighted by the fraction of high
income tax returns in each state (as of 2007).
Japan: Local taxes were taken from the National Tax Administration data.47
Canada: The tax rates series were taken from and described in Saez and Veall (2007).
All our results were performed using two measures of the eective marginal top tax rate:
the rst measure, reported in the text uses only the national and local income taxes. The
second measure, included in addition payroll taxes on both the employee and employer and
consumption taxes (VAT or sales taxes). Our results were broadly similar using both measures
(and are available on demand), but the higher condence we have in the quality of the income
tax data led us to report results using the rst measure in the text.
The available time spans vary for each country and we use the largest possible time period.
They are as follows: Australia (1975-2007), Canada (1975 - 2000), Denmark (1980 - 2005),
Finland (1975 - 2004), France (1975 - 2006), Germany (1975 - 1998), Ireland (1975 - 2000),
Italy (1975 - 2004), Japan (1975 - 2004), The Netherlands (1975 - 1999), New Zealand (1975 -
2005), Norway (1975 - 2008), Portugal (1976 - 2005), Spain (1981- 2008), Sweden (1975 - 2009),
Switzerland (1975 - 1995), United Kingdom (1975 - 2005), United States (1975 - 2008).
C.2 GDP, Population and Top Incomes Share Data
GDP series in constant US dollars are taken from the OECD statistics database (available at
stats.oecd.org). Our results were also cross-checked with income data from tax returns, provided
in the World Top Incomes Database.
Population Series for various age groups, used to construct the number of adults were also
taken from the OECD Statistics.
Total employment and average hours of work were taken from the OECD Statistics, except
for countries for which too many missing entries were found. In particular, for Ireland, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Germany data from the International Labor Oce on
employees and hours was used instead.
Data on the Top 1% income shares comes from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo
et al. 2011).
47We thank Yusuke Narita for kind help with the translation of the Japanese les.
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Figure 1: Top Marginal Income Tax Rates in the US, UK, France, Germany
This gure depicts the top marginal individual income tax rate in the US, UK, France, Germany since 1900.
The tax rate includes only the top statutory individual income tax rate applying to ordinary income with no
tax preference. State income taxes are not included in the case of the United States. For France, we include
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B. Top 1% and Bottom 99% Income Growth
Figure 2: Top Marginal Tax Rates, Top Incomes Shares, and Income Growth: US Evidence
1913-2008
Panel A depicts the top 1% income shares including realized capital gains in full diamonds and excluding
realized capital gains in empty diamonds. Computations are based on family market cash income. Income
excludes government transfers and is before individual taxes (source is Piketty and Saez, 2003, series updated
to 2008). Panel A also depicts the top marginal tax rate on ordinary income and on realized long-term capital
gains (source is Tax Policy Center). Panel B depicts real cash market income growth per adult of top 1%
incomes and bottom 99% incomes (base 100 in 1913), assuming that individual adult top 1% and bottom 99%
shares are the same as top 1% and bottom 99% family based shares.
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B. Top 1% Share and Top Marginal Tax Rate in 2004−8
Figure 3: Top Income Shares and Top Marginal Tax Rates: International Evidence 1975-9 and
2004-8
The gure depicts the top 1% income shares and top income tax rates (including both central and local
government individual income taxes) across 18 OECD countries in 1975-9 (Panel A) and 2004-8 (Panel B).
Source for top income shares is the World Top Incomes Database. Source for top income tax rates is OECD. If
the country does not have data for those years, we select the rst ve years after 1975 available and the most
recent 5 years (full details in appendix C). The correlation between top tax rates and top income shares is
much stronger in 2004-8 than in 1975-9 (see Table 2 for regression estimates).
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A. Changes Top 1% Share and Top Marginal Tax Rate
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B. Growth and Change in Top Marginal Tax Rate
Figure 4: Top Income Shares, Top Marginal Tax Rates, and Growth
Panel A depicts the change in top income shares against the change in top income tax rate from 1975-9 to
2004-8 based on Figure 2 data for 18 OECD countries. The correlation between those changes is very strong
(see Table 2 for regression estimates). Panel B depicts the change in real GDP per capita annual growth rate
from 1975-9 to 2004-8 against the change in top marginal tax rate. The correlation is virtually zero and
insignicant (but imprecise) suggesting that cuts in top tax rates do not lead to higher economic growth. Table




capital gains (to 
control for tax 
avoidance)
(1) (2)
A. 1975-1979 vs. 2004-2008 Comparison
Top Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) 1975-9 70% 70%
2004-8 35% 35%
Top 1% Income Share 1975-9 8.0% 9.1%
2004-8 17.7% 21.8%
Elasticity estimate:
  log (top 1% share) /  log (1-Top MTR) 1.03 1.12
B. Elasticity estimation (1913-2008): log(share) = a + e*log(1-Top MTR) + c*time + 
No time trend 0.25 0.26
(0.07) (0.06)
Linear time trend 0.30 0.29
(0.06) (0.05)
Number of observations 96 96
C. Effect of Top MTR on income growth (1913-2008): log(income) = a + b*log(1-Top MTR) + c*time + 
Top 1% real income 0.265 0.261
(0.047) (0.041)
Bottom 99% real income -0.080 -0.076
(0.040) (0.039)
Average real income -0.027 -0.027
(0.018) (0.034)
Number of observations 96 96
Table 1: US Evidence on Top Tax Rates, Top Income Shares, and Income Growth
Estimates from Panel A are obtained using series from Figure 2 (source is Piketty and Saez, 2003 for top income shares
and Tax Policy Center for top marginal tax rate). If the surge in top income shares is explained solely by the reduction in
the top marginal tax rate, then the elasticity is very large around one. The elasticity is the same for income excluding
capital gains and income including capital gains. As capital gains are treated more favorably and are the main channel of
avoidance for top incomes, this implies that tax avoidance plays no role in the surge of top incomes in the long-run.
Estimates from Panels B and C are obtained by time-series regressions over the period 1913-2008 (96 observations) and
using standard errors from Newey-West with 8 lags. Panel B shows significant elasticities of top 1% income shares with
respect to the net-of-tax rate (using the top MTR). Elasticities are virtually the same when excluding or including capital
gains and are robust to including a linear time trend in the regression. This shows that there is a strong link in the time-
series between top income shares and top MTR as evidenced in Figure 2A.
Panel C shows that real income growth of top 1% is strongly related to the net-of-tax rate (using the top MTR), confirming
the results of Panel B. Bottom 99% incomes are negatively related to the net-of-tax rate (using the top MTR) suggesting
that top 1% income gains came at the expense of bottom 99% earners. Average incomes (including both the top 1% and
bottom 99%) are not significantly related to the net-of-tax rate. Those results suggest that most of the elasticity of top
incomes is due to bargaining effects and not real supply side effects.A. Effect of the Top Marginal Income Tax Rate on Top 1% Income Share
A1. Cross Country Cross-Sectional Comparisons: 
Regression: log(Top 1% share) = a + e*log(1-Top MTR) + 
Elasticity in 1975-9 0.329
(0.148)
Elasticity in 2004-8 1.396
(0.381)
Number of obs. 18
A2. Cross Country Changes from 1975-9 to 2004-8:
Regression:  log( Top 1% share) = a + e*log(1-Top MTR) +  
Elasticity 0.490
(0.144)
Number of observations 18
A3. Full Time Series analysis (1975-2008): 
Regression: log(Top 1% share) = a + e*log(1-Top MTR) + 
No controls 0.561
(0.034)
Time trend control 0.512
(0.039)
Country fixed effects 0.455
(0.029)
Number of observations 518
B. Effect of the Top Marginal Income Tax Rate on real GDP per capita
Regression: log(real GDP per capita) = a + b*log(1-Top MTR) + c*time + 
No country fixed effects 0.027
(0.036)
Country fixed effects 0.012
(0.013)
Number of observations 518
Table 2: International Evidence on Top Tax Rates, Top Income 
Shares, and Income Growth
Panel A presents estimates the elasticity of top 1% incomes with respect to the net-of-
tax top marginal tax rate. Panel A1 presents regression estimates using cross-country
cross sectional data from Figure 3A (1975-9) and Figure 3B (2004-8). The regressions
are based on 18 OECD countries. Panel A2 presents a regression estimate using the
change from 1975-9 to 2004-8 for those 18 OECD countries. Panel A3 presents
regression estimates using complete panel from 1975 to 2008. Estimates are not 
Panel B presents regressions of the log real GDP per capita on the log net-of-tax rate.
The regressions include a time trend. The second regression include country fixed
effects to improve precision. The effect of the top MTR on GDP per capita growth is
small and insignificant. As discussed in the text, the estimate b is equal to *e1 where 
is the top 1% income share (around 10%) and e1 is the real supply side elasticity of top
incomes. Hence those estimates imply that e1 is not very large.0.5
e1 = 0.5 e1 = 0.2 e1 = 0.2 e1 = 0.2
e2 = 0.0 e2 = 0.3 e2 = 0.1 e2 = 0.0
e3 = 0.0 e3 = 0.0 e3 = 0.0 e3 = 0.3
1.5
20%
(a) e2=0.3 (b) e2=0.1
* = 57% * = 62 % * = 71 % * = 83%







Total elasticity e = e1 + e2 + e3 =
 (a) current 
narrow tax 
base
 (b) after 
base 
broadening
This table presents optimal top tax rates in the case where the overall elasticity of reported taxable income is
e=0.5 in three scenarios depending on how this total elasticity breaks down into the standard labor supply
elasticity (e1), the tax avoidance elasticity (e2), the compensation bargaining elasticity (e3). In scenario 1, the only
elasticity is e1. In scenario 2, both e1 and e2 are present, income shifted away from the regular tax is assumed to
be taxed at rate t=20%. Scenario 2(a) considers the case of the current narrow base with avoidance opportunities
and Scenario 2(b) considers the case where the base is first broadened so that e2 falls to 0.1 (end hence the total
elasticity e falls to 0.3). In scenario 3, both e1 and e3 are present. In all cases, top tax rates are set to maximize
tax revenue raised from top bracket earners.
Scenario 2: Tax 
avoidance effects
Optimal top tax rate * = (1+ tae2 + ae3)/(1+ae)
Pareto coefficient a =
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Alternative tax rate t =